




DIRTY HANDS AND COMMISSIONS OF INQUIRY: AN EXAMINATION OF THE 
INDEPENDENT LOCAL GOVERNMENT REVIEW PANEL IN NSW, AUSTRALIA 
 
ABSTRACT: We utilise the problem of dirty hands to consider the ethical dimensions of 
commissions of inquiry, particularly commissions of inquiry conducted for the purposes of 
public policy. The Independent Local Government Review Panel (ILGRP) in NSW is used as 
an example for the purposes of discussion. Four questions endemic to considerations of dirty 
hands are derived from Coady (2014). The framework affords various insights into the ethical 
terrain of this particular inquiry and those undertaken for the purposes of public policy more 
generally. We argue that commissions of this type and the ILGRP in particular cannot be 
labelled examples of dirty hands and that the concept of determinatio from the work of St 
Thomas Aquinas sheds light as to the nature of moral claims around commissions. We also 
argue that a fruitful analysis is afforded by Wallis’ (2013) analytic framework of the ‘logic of 
fateful choices faced by the leaders of commissions of inquiry’. Nevertheless, confusion 
surrounding the nature and types of inquiries is partially responsible for accusations of their 
ethical incoherence. 
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COMMISSIONS AND INQUIRIES: DEFINITIONAL AMBIGUITIES AND ETHICAL 
DIMENSIONS 
It would be difficult to overstate the salience of commissions and inquiries in Australian 
public life. For example, during the week 28 April to 2 May 2014 the work of the NSW 
Independent Commission Against Corruption (ICAC) led to the resignations of Marie 
Ficarra, Parliamentary Secretary to the Premier and Police Minister Mike Gallacher, 
following on from the resignation of Energy Minister Chris Harcher on the 4th of December 
of that year and the stunning resignation of the (then) NSW Premier, Barry O’Farrell on 16th 
April 2014 (Whitbourn et al., 2014). In the same week a National Commission of Audit 
(NCA) examining Commonwealth government expenditure, appointed by the Conservative 
Abbott Coalition Government and chaired by the former head of the Business Council of 
Australia Tony Shepherd, handed its ‘Final Report’ to Government. The ‘Final Report’ 
contained 64 recommendations inclusive of inter alia raising the pension age, introducing a 
compulsory co-payment for general practice medical consultation, increasing the contribution 
of tertiary students to their education and dismantling Commonwealth agencies for education 
and health care (NCA 2014a). 
Prima facie there are important qualitative distinctions between the two types of 
inquiry that were salient in that particular week in 2014. Scott Prasser (2006, 28) 
distinguished between ‘commissions to advise government on policy issues’ on one hand and 
what he referred to as ‘inquisitorial commissions’ on the other hand. According to Prasser 
(2006, 28) inquisitorial inquiries such as royal commissions1, are defined by remits to 
‘investigate allegations of impropriety and maladministration’. Alternatively, inquiries 
commissioned for the purposes of informing public policy are convened to do precisely that. 
                                                 
1 Prasser (2006, 32) noted that: ‘Contrary to conventional media reporting, royal commissions are not “judicial 
inquiries”. This impression arises because they are often chaired by present or past judges or other senior legal 
professionals and adopt many of the outward trappings and adversarial processes of courts. Royal commissions 





It is the latter type that are of central concern here, principally because such inquiries fall 
squarely within the auspices of the authors’ work; also because, prima facie at least, the 
ethical implications of public policy commissions are, arguably, less obvious to observers 
than those of the inquisitorial type2.  
Our central concern is with a seeming contradiction: Despite consistent proclamations 
as to their independence, on many occasions commissions of inquiry deliver findings and 
recommendations remarkably amenable to their commissioning governments, and often 
despite evidence to the contrary. A comprehensive survey of commissions of inquiry in this 
regard is beyond the scope of this paper, yet instances of this phenomenon are readily found. 
For example, Prasser (2006, 34) noted that both the Hawke Government’s 1984 Royal 
Commission into British Nuclear Tests in Australia between 1952-1963 and the Howard 
Government’s 2001 Royal Commission into the Building and Construction Industry were 
accused of precisely this type of bias. Similarly, Ross Giddens (2014) long-standing 
economics writer for the Sydney Morning Herald took issue with the aforementioned NCA’s 
five-volume ‘Final Report’ in precisely this regard, decrying what he termed ‘the blatancy of 
its commissioning. It comes from an “independent” inquiry effectively handed over to just 
one business lobby group, the one composed of the most highly paid chief executives in the 
country, the (big) Business Council’ (emphasis added). Giddens argued that the timbre of the 
NCA’s 64 recommendations was essentially predetermined, despite consistent annunciations 
that the Audit was ‘an independent body’ (NCA 2014b). 
                                                 
2 Despite the utility of the conceptually neat taxonomy introduced by Prasser (2006) we suggest that the 
distinction between these two types of inquiries can be considerably blurred. For example, the Royal 
Commission into Institutional Responses to Child Sexual Abuse initiated by the Gillard Government in January 
2013 is due to deliver its Final Report and Recommendations 31 December 2015 (RCIRCSA 2014). On 
February 11th 2013 Prime Minister Tony Abbott announced a Royal Commission into Union Governance and 
Corruption, aimed at ‘shining a light into the dark corners’ of the movement (Bourke 2014). Yet the extent to 
which either one of these inquiries would have been initiated by a government of the opposite political 





It is at this point that comparisons with what Tony Coady (2014) described as ‘the 
problem of dirty hands’ invite themselves. Coady (2014, 1) posited the following formulation 
of the ‘dirty hands’ scenario: ‘Should political leaders violate the deepest constraints of 
morality in order to achieve great goods or avoid disasters for their communities?’, adding: 
‘the importance and challenge of the dirty hands scenario is ‘not that hands get dirty from 
time to time but that it is right that they do so’ (Coady, 2014, 6; emphasis added). Coady 
(2014, 1) discussed what he termed ‘five issues’ in this regard: First, is the dirty hands 
scenario ‘simply confused with the merest contradiction [between moral and non-moral 
imperatives]?’; second, in cases where moral restraints are overridden, should this action be 
viewed as taking place ‘within normal morality or somehow beyond it?’; third, is the charge 
of dirty hands relevant only to a specifically political realm or is the idea more broadly 
applicable – and to what extent are citizens implicated in dirty hands’?; fourth: ‘how are the 
circumstances that call for dirty hands best described?’; fifth, ‘the dirty hands problem has 
affinities with the problem raised by moral dilemmas, but the question is: should those 
similarities be allowed to obscure the differences?’ 
In this context, the first four of Coady’s (2014) five issues can be made directly 
relevant to commissions of inquiry. First, is it contradictory that commissions of inquiry 
deliver ‘independent’ reports that nevertheless conform to what is required by government? 
Second, as a-typical servants of state, do commissioners justifiably operate outside the 
constraints of everyday morality? Third, to what extent (if at all) are citizens complicit in the 
problem? Fourth, the issues surrounding commissions of inquiry for the purposes of public 
policy are such that the question of how best to describe them is a good one to ask. 
To discuss these questions we examine the Independent Local Government Review 
Panel (ILGRP) run from 2011-2014 in NSW. While this particular example may feel quite 





we will see, the ILGRP comprised a wide-ranging, substantive and controversial process 
aimed at fundamental reform to local government in NSW. 
The paper is divided into four main parts. A brief overview of commission scholarship 
is provided, distinguishing between a political/sociological approach exemplified by the work 
of Prasser (1985; 2006) on the one hand and the ‘Appreciative Inquiry’ tradition initiated by 
Sir Geoffrey Vickers (1965) on the other hand. We assert that these two strands of inquiry 
scholarship (one descriptive and analytical, the other prescriptive) have in essence talked past 
one another despite being concerned with the same or similar phenomena. The case study is 
then described. Two prima facie objections to the applicability of dirty hands to commissions 
of inquiry are countered before we examine commissions generally and the ILGRP in 
particular using the four-part framework provided by Coady (2014). On this basis, we suggest 
that commissions of this type generally, and the ILGRP in particular, can be disqualified 
from being labelled dirty hands situations and that Aquinas’ concept of determinatio provides 
an account of the shape of moral argument around commissions of inquiry. Further, we 
suggest that the ethical dimensions of inquiries for public policy are more fruitfully explored 
using Wallis’ (2013) ‘logic of fateful choices facing the leaders of commissions of inquiry’. 
The gap between the sociological approach to commissions and that of Appreciative Inquiry 
is emphasised. 
TWO TYPES OF COMMISSION SCHOLARSHIP 
Before moving to the case study under examination here and commissions of inquiry for the 
purposes of advising public policy more generally, it is useful to draw a distinction between 
two different types of commission scholarship. The first we will describe as the political 
sociology of commissions of inquiry, as exemplified by the work of Scott Prasser (1985; 
2006). As (arguably) the leading exponent of commission scholarship in the Australian 





of advising on public policy, as well as offering observations as to the role of commissions in 
the structure of Australia’s polity and discussing the efficacy of this role. For example, 
Prasser (1985, 8-9) described a series of research questions for examining inquiries. In more 
recent work Prasser (2006, 29) documented the incidence of royal commissions of inquiry 
undertaken by various Commonwealth administrations in the period 1949-2005.  
The second identifiable type of commission scholarship, Appreciative Inquiry (AI), can 
be located in the broad field of public administration and in the particular area of policy 
studies. It has its genesis in Sir Geoffrey Vickers’ (1965) The Art of Judgement: A Study of 
Policy Making. For Vickers (1965, 13) policy-making is properly conceived as judgement, 
defined inter alia as ‘an ultimate category which can only be approved or condemned by a 
further exercise of the same authority’. Further, for Vickers (1965, 40) judgement ought to be 
understood initially as a ‘mental skill’ involving the constant renegotiation between ‘value 
judgements’ and ‘reality judgements’. Moreover: ‘The relationship between judgements of 
fact and judgements of value is close and mutual; for facts are relevant only in relation to 
some judgement of value and judgements of value are only operative in relation to some 
configuration of fact’ (Vickers 1965, 40). On this account, institutions ought to be viewed as 
‘dynamic system[s] of precarious stability (Vickers 1965, 30). 
In his original work, Vickers’ (1965, 30-66) examined three commissions of inquiry, 
demonstrating in each case that the commissioners were obliged to cast about for values 
within which to frame their facts and vice versa. This process he termed appreciation. 
Further, Vickers (1965) argued that this is how executive action ought proceed: ‘Nothing is 
more inimical to the process of solving executive problems than to change the specification 
of the problem or even to suggest that it might have changed’ (Vickers 1965, 39). 
While this tweaking the nose of epistemic dualism may appear old hat 





advise on public policy are profound. On this account, problems are decidedly not ‘solved’. 
On the contrary, in the language of two contemporary advocates of AI: ‘[A] steadfast 
commitment to a problem-solving view of the world acts as a primary constraint on … 
imagination and contribution to knowledge’; further: ‘through our assumptions and choice of 
method we largely create the world we later discover’ (Cooperrider and Srivastva 1987, 129).  
Of course it may be objected that this account of AI gives short shrift to this type of 
commission scholarship3. In particular, AI and the work of Vickers (1965) are discernible in 
the public policy literature (see, for example, Majone 1989). However, our task here initially 
is to demonstrate the fundamental distinction between the two types of commission 
scholarship. It is also to demonstrate how profoundly dissimilar commission scholarship of 
the AI prescriptive type is from the inquisitorial type identified in the introduction to our 
discussion. We now proceed to the case study.  
NSW INDEPENDENT LOCAL GOVERNMENT REVIEW PANEL (ILGRP) 
Notwithstanding its prosaic nature, local government has been a hotbed of the types of 
inquiries with which we are concerned. NSW local government was the subject of six major 
processes of inquiry to inform public policy in the period 2011-14 with the ILGRP 
comprising the centrepiece of these processes (Gooding 2013). It was established by the 
(then) Minister of Local Government ‘to draw on independent expertise to help tackle issues 
and identify how councils can best govern and be structured to support the future wellbeing 
and prosperity of NSW communities’ (Page, 2012, 4; emphasis added). The three-person 
panel comprised Graham Sansom, Professor at the Australian Centre of Excellence for Local 
Government (ACELG) at the University of Technology, Sydney, alongside Jude Munro, 
former CEO of Brisbane City Council and Greg Inglis, a former local government CEO and 
                                                 
3 Like other works of its type (the authors are thinking here of Mark Moore’s (1995) Creating Public Value) AI 
has found a home in other social scientific disciplines, in particular in program evaluation (see, for example, 
Elliot 1999; Whitney and Trosten-Brown 2003; Preskill and Catsambas 2006) One such text (Elliot 1999, v) 
observes that: ‘To date most applications of appreciative inquiry have taken place in the corporate world’. This 





‘specialist strategic local government advisor’ (ILGRP 2014a). In this regard the Panel 
members conform to Vickers (1965, 55) description of heads of commissions of inquiry as 
‘experienced men [sic] of affairs’. 
The Panel’s work was embedded in a narrative of economic development, namely ‘the 
broader objectives of the State as outlined in “NSW 2021: A Plan to Make NSW Number 
One”’ (IILGRP 2014b). The Terms of Reference (ToRs) directed it to seven ‘Key Actions’ 
including inter alia developing models for structural reform (i.e.: council amalgamation), 
options for increasing council own-source revenue, alternative governance arrangements and 
more clearly delineating state and local government responsibilities (ILGRP 2014b; the 
details of these mooted reforms are of marginal interest in this context). It was also directed 
to be cognisant of several other considerations, the most salient of which was ‘to take into 
account the Liberal-National’s [i.e.: the incumbent government’s] 2011 election policy of ‘no 
forced amalgamations’ of councils (ILGRP 2013).  
In the context of our discussion of dirty hands, the latter directive was particularly 
significant: Historically, across Australian state and territory governments have consistently 
implemented programs of forced amalgamations with the rationale that these processes result 
in scale and scope economies, despite the protestations of the communities – in particular, 
their elected and appointed officials – and contrary to a weight of evidence suggesting that 
said efficiencies are largely illusory (see, for example, Dollery, Grant and Kortt 2013). In 
essence, many suspected that the ILGRP was a stalking horse for a program of forced 
amalgamations (see Dollery 2013). 
Events that subsequently transpired have borne this suspicion out: The Panel produced 
a series of reports – many of them commissioned – in its 14 months of operation, alongside 
conducting extensive community consultation (see, for example, ILGRP 2013). The ‘Final 





recommendations. Despite the raft of reforms contained therein, media attention – and public 
policy – subsequently focused upon the process of radical consolidation recommended by the 
Panel. Under this plan 32 councils in the greater Sydney region would be reduced to 
approximately seven and a range of structural reforms would be introduced across most of the 
remainder of the state (ILGRP 2013). In essence, the Panel dispensed with the 2011 
commissioning government’s stated policy and conferred with its widely suspected secret 
agenda, arguing that: ‘Sooner or later amalgamations will have to be part of the package: the 
number of councils in NSW has halved during the past century and that trend will surely 
continue’ (ILGRP 2013, 7).  
The ensuing response by the Government – despite its 2011 pre-election pledge – was 
to wholeheartedly embrace the recommendations of the Panel with respect to council 
amalgamation and offer a range of financial incentives for those local governments to merge 
(see OLG 2014). At the same time it did not discount forced amalgamation (see, for example, 
Kenny 2014). 
With the details of this case study in mind, our discussion is framed by a degree of 
scepticism surrounding the efficacy of processes of inquiry for the purposes of public policy 
generally, in particular a suspicion that there might be some type of ‘dirty hands’ activity 
associated with commissioned bodies consistently proclaiming their ‘independence’ while at 
the same time delivering recommendations commensurate with what governments wish to 
see. In the next section of the paper, we examine the issue of ‘dirty hands’ in relation to the 
ILGRP utilising Coady’s (2014) ‘four issues’ outlined in our introduction. However, initially 







DIRTY HANDS AND COMMISSIONS OF INQUIRY: TWO QUESTIONS OF 
ELIGIBILITY 
The first objection to the eligibility of dirty hands to commissions of inquiry is that according 
to some interpretations of dirty hands the type of scenario described above does not entail the 
moral gravity that forms a necessary requirement to qualify. For example, Coady (2014, 1) 
initially describes dirty hands as situations where ‘political leaders violate the deepest 
constraints of morality in order to achieve great goods or avoid disasters for their 
communities’ (emphasis added). However, this reason for exclusion can be countered on the 
basis of what Coady (2014, 3-5) labelled the ‘shifting interpretations’ of dirty hands. For 
example, Coady (2014 3) notes that in ‘Political Action: The Problem of Dirty Hands’ 
(Walzer 1973, 162) the phenomenon is far more mundane, defined as: ‘[A] central feature of 
political life, that … arises not merely as an occasional crisis in the career of this or that 
unlucky politician but systematically or frequently’. This understanding conforms to Bernard 
Williams’ (1978, 55) use of the term, namely: ‘It is in cases where the politician does 
something morally disagreeable, that I am concerned with’ (emphasis added)4. Understood in 
this sense, commissions and their governments performing what Giddens (2014) labelled a 
‘blatancy of commissioning’ are not excluded from dirty hands on the mere basis that the 
cases are not sufficiently serious from a moral standpoint. In the example of our case study, it 
is encapsulated by the accusation that, despite all of its work, the ILGRP was merely a 
stalking horse for a program of radical amalgamation. Our point here is not to dismiss the 
importance of the issue of the moral gravity of an act; rather, it is to observe that the issue of 
gravity is at least equivocal. 
A second prima facie reason for excluding commissions of inquiry from consideration 
might be more damming, namely that dirty hands ought to apply only to the actions of 
                                                 
4 While Williams (1978, 71) moved to distinguish between the morally disagreeable or distasteful and the 
morally criminal based upon the category of ‘violence’, the majority of his discussion is taken up with non-





politicians. On this account, agency is the crucial issue and as we have seen, for both ideal-
types of inquiries (i.e.: inquisitorial and public policy) commissioners decidedly do not have 
a prescribed role in decision-making. Further, in the case of commissions of inquiry for the 
purposes of public policy this objection of non-agency seems particularly cutting because 
they are defined by their advisory, rather than decision-making role. 
This objection can also be countered. First, action by politicians is in fact a necessary 
element of any commission of inquiry: They have to commission the process and decide 
whether and how to act upon recommendations. Second, there is an intuitive case for 
classifying politicians and commissioners as belonging to the same club: In our example of 
the ILGRP, clearly the three panel members were persons of eminence, and by virtue of 
appointment, potentially influential. Bernard Williams (1978, 58) makes precisely this point, 
arguing that it is important to consider whether an individual is ‘the originator of action, or at 
least a joint originator of action, rather than one who [merely] participates in a party or a 
government, or acquiesces, with respect to decisions he does not help to make’ (emphasis 
added). We think that this aptly describes particular types of behaviour by commissioners and 
return to the issue of acquiescence or otherwise in due course. We now utilise the four 
elements of dirty hands discussed by Coady (2014) in order to structure our discussion of 
commissions of inquiry generally and the ILGRP in particular5. 
 
DIRTY HANDS, COMMISSIONS OF INQUIRY AND THE ILGRP 
Outside morality? Political realism and determinatio 
Coady’s (2014, 5) first line of inquiry is that dirty hands ‘seem … to involve a contradiction 
or paradox’. This description appears to fit many commissions of inquiry and their 
                                                 
5 The other way that commissioners are implicated is by choosing the content of their advice. Thus, even if the 
executive (i.e.: political) decision is made by others the decision to provide a certain type of advice is a matter of 
private morality for the commissioners themselves. The authors would like the editors of this special edition for 





governments: The independence of commissions is proclaimed, yet they consistently produce 
recommendations that governments wish to see. Although Coady (2014, 5) is referring more 
specifically to the rightness of an action and the moral guilt of the person who performs it, 
commissions also appear to conform to the type initially discussed by Bernard Williams 
(1978). Williams (1978, 63) was interested in the situation where a morally disagreeable 
political act has been done and from which there may well be what he refers to as a ‘moral 
remainder, [an] uncancelled moral disagreeableness’ and for which there are victims who are 
aware that they have been wronged by a political act.  
For Coady (2014, 5) this charge of dirty hands can be overcome using two familiar 
lines of moral theorising: For consequentialists the paradox can be resolved by assuming that 
the course of action that ought to be taken results in the greatest happiness for the greatest 
number and accepting the residual consequences as (perhaps) unfortunate but justifiable. 
Alternatively, from a deontological perspective, any wrongs are proscribed in the first place, 
so the problem does not arise.  
Either of these solutions might be possible courses of action for a particular type of 
dirty hands situation, namely the ‘supreme emergency’ (see, for example, Walzer 2004). A 
particular politician (or, dare we suggest, a corporate form of leadership – a cabinet, for 
example) could adopt a consequentialist stance with respect to (in Walzer’s (2004) scenario) 
the slaughter of civilians in order that a worse event is avoided. Alternatively, a morally 
absolutist argument would form a line in the sand from which no action could proceed6. 
However, public inquiries of the type we are concerned with here are decidedly 
different situations, conforming to the more mundane understanding of dirty hands. In these 
circumstances the hard and fast theoretical solutions that Coady (2014) finds applicable to 
supreme emergencies appear not to apply, not for reasons of a lack of moral gravity discussed 
                                                 
6 These two approaches effectively dissolve the dirty hands problem by revealing that it isn’t a moral problem at 
all. However, as suggested in the ensuing discussion, we in no way mean to imply that these are the only two 





earlier but because there are a series of trade-offs around a series of issues. Further, the idea 
that ‘non-moral oughts’ can trump moral ones (Coady 2014, 6) is particularly unsatisfactory 
in the public policy realm: The claim to realism is properly a descriptive rather than 
normative claim7. Deployed otherwise, it is widely recognised as self-serving ideology (see, 
for example, Heywood 2011, 53). 
Another way of understanding the vexation around the ILGRP is by a consideration of 
St Thomas Aquinas’ concept of determinatio. Jeremy Waldron (2010, 1-2) defines 
determinatio as the process of translating natural law into positive law and the variability 
implied in this process8. Thus (for example): ‘Natural law principles might indicate that a 
house should be sturdy and weather-proof … But still, in designing a particular house, the 
architect has choices to make – choices of detail – which are not governed precisely by the 
natural law principles to which he (sic) is responding’.  
In accord with general accounts of Aquinas’ work (see, for example, Velasquez and 
Brady 1997) Waldron (2010) notes the work that is determinatio (i.e.: from natural to positive 
law) will change over time and that ‘the integration of even an uncontroversial requirement of 
practical reasonableness into law will not be a simple matter’ (Finnis, cited in Waldron 2010, 
3). Further: ‘the lawmaker has to do all this and his work may look quite unfamiliar to the 
layman’ (Waldron 2010, 4). Moreover, Waldron (2010, 4-5) points out that the legal process 
                                                 
7 The authors would like to thank an anonymous reviewer for pointing this out. 
8 The definition of both natural law and positive law is discussed by Robert P. George (2008). For George 
(2008, 144) natural law ‘consists of three sets of principles’: First, ‘those directing human choice and action 
toward intelligible purposes, i.e.: basic human goods, which … as intrinsic aspects of human well-being … 
constitute reasons for action whose intelligibility as reasons does not depend on any more fundamental reasons; 
Second: ‘a set of “intermediate” moral principles which specify which specify the most basic principle of 
morality’ through action motivated to achieve human fulfilment; Third: ‘specific moral norms which require or 
forbid (sometimes with, sometimes without exceptions) certain specific possible choices’. 
 
For George (2008, 148) ‘natural law itself requires that someone (or some group of persons or some institution) 
exercise authority in political communities … by translating certain principles of natural law into positive law 
and reinforcing and backing up these principles with the threat of punishment for law-breaking’. Further, 
Aquinas, following Aristotle, observed that the translation from natural to positive law occurs in two ways. The 
first is ‘more or less direct’ and ‘designed to inhibit grave injustices’. However, the second requires the 
legislator exercising ‘a kind of creativity, not deduction, to construct a system of laws by the activity of the 





is complex, involving a range of actors – judges, yes, but also legislators (and 
commissioners) – who at times will work in accord with one another and sometimes not.  
Waldron (2010) makes two additional points of particular relevance in this context. 
First, we can evaluate the outcomes as better or worse (‘It can be a botched job; it can be 
dangerously incomplete, or it can be … an enterprise carried too far (Waldron 2010, 11)). 
Second (and most importantly in this context):  
 
Since our natural law reasoning is not infallible, sometimes we will be applying 
determinatio to a conviction or judgement which is not (as we think it is) a true 
apprehension of natural law. Perhaps we will disagree about this: some people will say 
that natural law requires one thing in a given area and others will say it requires 
something different. They will compete to occupy the position of human law-maker, 
and when one side gets it, it will be to their convictions about natural law (in that area) 
that they try to give the form of human law (Waldron 2010, 4; emphasis added).  
 
This rings true of our case study: Throughout the course of the ILGRP’s activity what we 
might term relatively mundane instrumental reasons (efficiency; capacity) were offered up 
for the Panel’s recommendations in total and in particular its proposed amalgamation 
program. These reasons were frequently countered (see, for example, Dollery 2013). 
However, more interestingly the Panel also consistently appealed to a sense of historical 
inevitability as an element of its justification: ‘Sooner or later amalgamations will have to be 
part of the package’ (ILGRP 2013, 7). The Government fell in line with this justification: 
‘It’s clear that our system of local government - with boundaries dating back to the 19th 
century - will not be able to meet the needs of growing and changing communities’ (Baird in 





Equally (and we will assert, rather than argue this point in this context) claims made 
against programs of consolidation generally are more vexatious and more profoundly felt 
than other examples of disagreement over public policy options. We are by no means 
suggesting that they are singular in this regard: For example, arguments about the 
inviolability of public transport provision can have a similar tone. Yet the point in this 
context is that the concept of determinatio as discussed by Waldron (2010) provides an 
account of the nature of disagreement in our case study and (perhaps) the charge against other 
commissions of inquiry. As such, they are not accurately labelled ‘dirty hands’ situations of 
the more mundane type. Namely, it is not a problem of doing what is morally prohibited due 
to other overriding moral reasons, but a case of differing opinions about what is the right 
thing to do, practically speaking, in a particular situation.  
 
Inside morality: Virtue ethics 
Coady’s (2014, 8) second line of inquiry (or ‘route out of the paradox’) is to concede that 
‘morality is not entirely coherent or self-consistent’. On this account, the way out of the 
paradox is anchored far more firmly in the ethical character of the individual rather than the 
nature of the act itself or indeed in what might be termed any structural justification of such 
an act or acts. Indeed, this is Williams’ (1968 56) point of departure: ‘What sort of persons do 
we want and need to be politicians?’ and it is with this terrain Williams (1978) is largely 
concerned. Here, the political scientist is on very familiar ground in that the morality of 
leaders is set against that of us ordinary folk. Michael Walzer (2004, cited in Coady 2014, 8) 
embraces this, arguing that this is ‘”what political leaders are for”’.  
Tony Coady (2014 9) takes issue with the flexibility with which Walzer (2004) plays 
this card, arguing (for example) that the extinction of all members of a community is entirely 





example of the ILGRP, the latter argument, grounded in the language of an economic 
imperative (also a degree of historicism), is a familiar enough refrain from both governments 
and commissions. This serves to underline the importance of criticism of these types of 
justifications if they are espoused for pursuing particular courses of public policy. 
But what of the question of commissions of inquiry conforming to a bona fide 
definition of dirty hands? Again, Coady’s (2014, 10) discussion of the work of Michael 
Walzer generally is instructive here, with him arguing that the conceptual distinction between 
an excuse for a particular action – amounting to an admission of fault – and a justification for 
an action – amounting to ‘”an assertion of innocence”’ (Walzer’s phrase) does not hold in the 
case of dirty hands. Coady (2014, 10) is insistent on this point, arguing that dirty hands 
involves both, and as such collapses an important distinction: ‘[W]hat is justified needs no 
excuse and the unjustifiable is sometimes excusable’. In the case of commissions of inquiry 
generally, and our example in particular, the idea of advancing a prescribed course of public 
policy based upon an excuse is counterintuitive: For Coady (2014, 10) and we would suggest, 
Williams (1978) dirty hands has to involve an admission of fault from which one is asked to 
be excused. Certainly the ILGRP did not evince any behaviour of this type: Justifications (we 
have argued) exhibiting particular characteristics (instrumental, yes, but of other types as 
well) were its modus operandi. As such, again, our Independent Panel is excluded from being 
engaged in a dirty hands scenario insofar as what they did not believe that what they were 
doing was morally wrong. 
 
The complicity of citizens 
With respect to whether or not (if at all) citizens are complicit in dirty hands, Coady (2014, 
13) explored the idea that a moral division of labour is legitimate alongside an instrumental 





authorise leaders to do whatever they like in the pursuit of particular ends. This conforms to 
Williams’ discussion (1978) generally: The character of the leaders is pivotal. Further, both 
emphasise that there is no unanimity of consent in democratic politics, particularly 
concerning everyday morally disagreeable decisions. In this respect, Williams (1978, 63) 
discusses the problem of victims, while Coady (2014, 14) puts the shoe on the other foot, 
arguing that: ‘[A]t least those of us who agree that [a particular decision] is right are involved 
in what they do and have some responsibility for it. Indeed, we are more than tainted, we are 
complicit’.  
With respect to commissions of inquiry generally and the ILGRP in particular, for some 
individuals the dissolution of their political communities into larger entities might be a 
profound injustice. It may be that the political rhetoric of the local government sector – that 
local government is ‘closer to the people’ and that democratic voice and democratic choice’ 
for local communities – are heart-felt and the objections to amalgamation, not merely on 
(contestable) instrumental grounds but on grounds involving identity and difference, are 
profound enough to conform to William’s (1978) discussion of moral disagreeability. 
However, the idea of citizens’ being morally complicit is dealt with far more readily using 
the idea of determinatio, suggesting that the situation is not one of dirty hands; i.e.: the 
amalgamation of local governments is not itself an absolute violation of justice; rather, the 
justice or injustice of the amalgamation would be contingent on the efficacy of the policy.  
 
Describing the circumstances that call for dirty hands: Wallis (2013) 
Coady (2014, 14-16) then turns his attention to how the circumstances of dirty hands are best 
described. Initially he is concerned with distinguishing between moral absolutism and dirty 
hands, arguing that if we align dirty hands with either Thomas Nagel’s ‘threshold ontology’ 





significantly militated against. In this context we will defer to an account of the actions of 
commissioners of inquiry that begins within the domain of the descriptive, but from which 
we can reflect upon the moral considerations therein. This account is based on the recent 
work of Joe Wallis (2013). 
On this account, Wallis (2013, p. 11) asks us to accept that commissioners of inquiry 
have a strong motivation to undertake their work with earnestness and verve. Wallis (2013) 
argued that a lot is at stake for the individual when they are appointed to these roles: 
Appointment is based on their expertise, indeed eminence. However, they are also aware that 
in many instances the work of inquiries is simply left on the shelf: discarded for reasons of 
political expediency. Wallis (2013, 10) also asks us to accept (reasonably, we think) that any 
head of any inquiry will face a ‘”fateful day” of existential choice … on the day when the 
incumbent government makes public the degree to which it is prepared to endorse his [sic] 
policy proposals’. Further: ‘On that day, the commissioner will have to “come out of the 
closet” and “reveal his or her true colours” as either an acquiescent or an autonomous 
commissioner”. The choice is represented in Figure 1. 
Figure 1: Existential logic of commissioner behaviour 
 






Examining Figure 1, according to Wallis’ (2013) ‘analytic framework’ all commissioners will 
initially be motivated to be judged as autonomous: As such, they will work to ‘enhance the 
receptivity of the government to [their] proposals’ (Wallis, 2013, 10). This is represented by 
the ideal-type curve in Figure 1stretching diagonally across the graph, where the agenda of 
government coincides, over time, with the agenda of the commissioner. However, during the 
course of the inquiry and while waiting for the government’s response commissioners realise 
that this might not eventuate. At that point (and despite their verve, indeed authority during 
the inquiry) they will realise that this glory might not be theirs. Yet the option for roundly and 
publically dismissing the government’s response to their work is not realistically open: Their 
work is finished; they are not politicians. While they might privately dismiss the response of 
government they are hardly in a position to openly reject it. So the choice is either one of 
autonomy (represented by the diagonal curve across Figure 1) or acquiescence (represented in 
the curve at left that U-turns back and where the ‘net benefits’ on the Y axis are both 
diminished and short-lived). The benefits derived from acting in an autonomous manner and 
successfully shaping the agenda of a process of inquiry extend beyond the graph in that they 
mark a significant watershed in public policy formulation and implementation, benefitting the 
commissioner. 
Either way, despite the stated, necessary requirement for separation during an inquiry, 
commissioners have a strong motivation for more or less continually assessing what the 
government is thinking. At the same time, governments will seek advance knowledge of the 
commission’s thinking to plan policy to address the findings of any inquiry; additionally, they 
will want to guard against being caught off-balance by the findings and recommendations of 
an inquiry they themselves have commissioned.  
In the example of the ILGRP, there are good reasons for arguing that Wallis’ (2013) 





accurate, general depiction of events. The consistent proclamation of independence is 
reiterated throughout the report and government documents. There is also evidence to suggest 
that the inquiry was undertaken in an appreciative (as opposed to acquiescent) mode: The 
production of a series of reports and extensive consultation suggests a revisiting of ‘reality 
judgements’ (in Vickers’ (1965) parlance) and the rhetoric of the Independent Panel is indeed 
appreciative – the ‘Final Report’ is titled ‘Revitalising Local Government’ (ILGRP 2013b; 
emphasis added). Did the Panel grasp the nettle of amalgamation with a view to the future 
(and their own posterity?) or did it acquiesce to the tacit wishes of government? We will 
possibly never know, but the point is that Wallis’ (2013) ‘analytic framework’ captures what 
was going on.  
While not engaged in explicitly in ethical theorising, elements of Wallis’ (2013) 
analytic framework do touch on points of our discussion of ethics in our consideration of 
dirty hands. For example, it might be tempting to argue that the choice between the two 
‘fateful choices’ offered by the framework is too stark. However, this either/or scenario does 
reflect Williams’ (1978, 58) account of ‘the politician as the originator of action’ or 
alternatively one who acquiesces ‘with respect to decisions which he does not help to make’. 
Further, it places what might be termed a roughly equivalent emphasis on the role of 
leadership as derived from both Coady (2014) and Williams (1978). This is not simply 
because it is concerned with those working within a concentrated realm of decision-making 
and responsibility that we (along with Williams (1978) and Vickers (1965)) identify as the 
political realm. Rather, it is because it focuses upon the ethical dimension of behaviour: In 
Wallis’ (2013) analytic framework the commissioner is depicted in a dialogue with herself 
about what it is a good course of action.  
We are also concerned here with what Williams (1978) suggests we ought to be, 





Wallis (2013) offers it is reasonable to suggest that it is precisely this kind of ethical 
reasoning that commissioners engage in. One sort of ideal-type commissioner – and her 
group – might behave in a more-or-less openly transgressive manner, seeking the opinions of 
her commissioning politicians, or behave in an Iago-like fashion to achieve the same ends. 
Another sort of ideal-type commissioner and her group might choose to act according to the 
strictures of legal proceedings when it comes to eliciting what the government really wants. 
But the reality is likely somewhere between these two extremes of behaviour. Williams’ 
(1978, 64) injunction that we ought to want ‘those who are reluctant or disinclined to do the 
morally disagreeable when it is really necessary’ such that they ‘have much chance of not 
doing it when it is not necessary’ is wise. This brings us back to the problem of dirty hands. 
 
CONCLUDING REMARKS 
Our central concern has been to investigate the ethical nature of the phenomenon whereby 
commissions of inquiry are accused of conforming to the wishes of their commissioning 
governments despite repeated proclamations as to their independence. Specifically, we 
investigated whether or not this constitutes an example of dirty hands. In addressing these 
related questions, our first observation is that dirty hands is a ‘movable feast’, varying 
between a narrow interpretation (Walzer’s (2004) ‘supreme emergency’) on the one hand and 
a broader idea concerned with morally disagreeable, but nevertheless right acts of politicians 
on the other hand. Despite this moveability, the core feature of dirty hands is a contradiction 
or paradox that aligns with the ‘blatancy of commissioning’ (Giddens 2014) as we initially 
labelled it here. 
We argued that two prima facie objections to the relevance of dirty hands to 
commissions of inquiry, namely the issue of moral gravity and the question of agency, can 





of both commissioners and their governments ought not to be labelled as an example of dirty 
hands for several reasons. Misleading claims to political realism aside, our account of 
determinatio derived from Waldron (2010) gives us an explanation for the depth of 
disagreement against findings of commissions generally and that of our case study in 
particular: There is a claim to a ‘natural’ order (though not, we hasten to add, a necessarily 
religious one) which may be characteristic of lawmaking generally. Further, on the account of 
Williams (1978, 64) the contradiction is addressed by recourse to virtue ethics: In the face of 
hard decisions we must trust that leaders (in particular, but not exclusively) have ‘a habit of 
reluctance [as] an essential obstacle against the happy acceptance of the intolerable’. 
Moreover, citizens are implicated in the actions of their leaders but this will not be all citizens 
all of the time; only those that agree with a commission’s findings and a government’s 
actions will bear responsibility (although less so) for these. The complexity of a democratic 
polity also diffuses any paradox. 
Yet it is important that we understand the reason for the mislabelling that we have 
investigated here and the nature of the relationship between commissioning governments, 
those they commission and, in democratic polities, their constituents and the public more 
broadly. We argue that this arises from the consistent proclamation of independence by both 
parties. This is the source of the contradictory and paradoxical nature of commissions, for 
clearly they are not independent. The utility of the ‘analytic framework’ offered by Wallis 
(2013) is that it provides a more nuanced account of the ethical deliberations of those 
commissioned for the sake of advising on public policy. Wallis’ (2013) directs us to the 
ethical nature of the situation/s that commissions face. 
Finally, there exists a profound gap between the work of commission scholars who 
examine commissions of inquiry from the perspective of political sociology (Prasser 1985; 





evidence that we have offered to support this assertion has admittedly been slim. 
Nevertheless it is borne out in the fact that while Prasser (2006) draws the distinction 
between inquisitorial inquiries and those conducted for public policy, a discussion of 
appreciative inquiry is absent from his work. The misunderstanding of what public policy 
commissions of inquiry do may well in part be due to a blurring of this type of inquiry with 
those that are inquisitorial. However, we would assert that it is also due to the relative 
invisibility of appreciative inquiry with political sociology as a discipline as well. The utility 
of Wallis’ (2013) theory is not only that it provides a framework for understanding the ethical 
dimension of the work of commissions, it is also that it moves some way toward knitting the 
two traditions of analysis – political-social and appreciative. This renders a more interesting 
account of the work of commissions than the casual (and incorrect) accusation of dirty hands. 
Perhaps then the work of commissioners such as the individuals comprising the Independent 
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